Strategic partnership: a Berlin-Moscow axis

Marian Miszalski

Marian Miszalski

In Sochi near Yalta, Crimea, there was a meeting between the Russian President, the German Chancellor and the French President. The brief press release after the summit stated that there were talks on security issues related to terrorist threats. The schedule of the meeting was that first Germany's Chancellor met the Russian President and then the French President joined them. Did Putin and Schroeder present Chirac some stand, which they had earlier taken?

Just after the meeting the German Chancellor stated that 'there is a strategic partnership between Russia and Germany'. It may not mean yet that the Paris-Berlin axis (stimulating the European politics) has been cancelled for the Berlin-Moscow axis, but it may mean that these two axes have already become equivalent...

Soon after the meeting in Sochi President Kwasniewski went first to Moscow and then to Paris. He was welcomed coldly in Moscow and the visit ended - speaking subtly - with 'lack of success'. Media reports presented the visit in such a way that Putin did not question Kwasniewski but made him listen to what he had to say... In turn, in Paris Kwasniewski was given vague and trivial, soothing assurances that the relationships between France and Poland would be better ever since. Was it so because of that 'strategic partnership' between Russia and Germany, which the Chancellor had announced?

In the 20th century the relationships between German and Russia underwent an interesting evolution. World War I was to a great extent the war between Germany and Russia over the legacy left by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in other words over Central Europe. Since these two monarchies had heavy losses in battles none captured war booty and in the Austro-Hungarian territories a few independent countries were created, including Poland, which gained independence after 150 years of historical oblivion. But after 20 years of relative peace Germany and Russia were again rivals for this part of Europe. However, it is worth noticing that Hitler's final decision to attack Russia was preceded by many interwar years of fruitful co-operation between Germany and Russia: Germany delivered weapons to the Soviets, trained the Soviet army, used the Russian resources abundantly and finally Germany and Russia divided Europe (and Poland) into spheres of influence, confirmed by the Ribbenthrop-Molotov pact. Although Hitler betrayed Stalin quickly and brutally, and attacked the Soviets the long political German-Soviet flirt and common 'planning of Europe' undoubtedly left a clear trace on the German and Russian thinking about the politics in Europe. Is this today's 'strategic partnership' between Germany (re-united) and Russia not some continuation and development of that former flirt into a firmer political alliance, which was cleaned out of old 'mistakes and distortions'? It would be worthwhile to notice that united Germany, today aspiring to the role of a world empire, and Russia, which has never lost this status, disclose common interests in marginalization, and even removal of American influence from Europe. There originates a fairly fundamental collision with the Polish thinking about European politics, which sees in the very American presence - after the experiences of two world wars - an essential element of security of Poland and this European region. Poland's accession to the European Union - without early regulation of ownership issues in the Regained Territories - proves quite convincingly that the pro-German option, called 'the Prussian party' by some commentators, won in the left-wing establishment, which has governed Poland since 1989 (almost without any break). This option neglected (deliberately or unconsciously) both the matter of German compensation claims, which refer to one third of the Polish territory, and the possible, real, progressing rapprochement between Germany and Russia. Once the experienced politician and historian Stanislaw Cat-Mackiewicz noticed accurately that the warmer the relations between Berlin and Moscow became, the more marginalized the position of Warsaw was...

After 1989 the pro-American option opposed to a moderate extent (because it was not publicized) the pro-German, pro-EU option. It shows the existence of several countries, which are in a very unfavourable political environment (Taiwan, South Korea and Israel) and have a special political and economic relationship with the United States, which does not only assure them security but also quite decent economic development. However, the pro-American option has not made it clearly enough to the public opinion in Poland and to the ruling elite.

It is an obvious fact that in the EU and in non-EU European countries there was no voice raised for Poland concerning the German compensatory demands. Is it then an exaggeration to claim that we are falling into international isolation in spite of our membership in the EU and NATO? Is some association with worthless French-British 'guaranties' of 1939 unjustified? In the meantime the Germans declare that they will not content themselves with filing claims against Poland to the EU tribunal but they will join the claims of the Jewish Restitution Organisations (holocaust business) in America...

A few days after the meeting between the German Chancellor and the Russian President, the President of Ukraine announced unexpectedly that the eastern Polish lands (the region of Chelm and part of Lublin region) were 'indigenous Ukrainian lands'. It was immediately put down to the approaching election campaign in Ukraine, but will not some Ukrainian 'compensatory claims' in turn appear after the campaign? It was not long ago when the Germans antagonised the Ukrainians against Poland...

After the unification of Germany the European history and politics has fallen back into the pre-war rut. The 'strategic partnership' between Germany and Russia, which Germany's Chancellor just announced, confirms this opinion. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned increasing isolation it does not seem that Polish international politics has been well prepared for this circumstance. The EU membership does not also seem to secure us against possible effects of this new situation.

Editor: Tygodnik Katolicki "Niedziela", ul. 3 Maja 12, 42-200 Czestochowa, Polska
Editor-in-chief: Fr Jaroslaw Grabowski • E-mail: redakcja@niedziela.pl